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Abstract
Two great problems of learning confront humanity: learning about the nature of the universe
and our place in it, and learning how to become civilized. The first problem was solved, in
essence, in the 17th century, with the creation of modern science. But the second problem has
not yet been solved. Solving the first problem without also solving the second puts us in a
situation of great danger. All our current global problems have arisen as a result. What we
need to do, in response to this unprecedented crisis, is learn from our solution to the first
problem how to solve the second. This was the basic idea of the 18th century Enlightenment.
Unfortunately, in carrying out this programme, the Enlightenment made three blunders, and it
is this defective version of the Enlightenment programme that we have institutionalized in 20th
century academic inquiry. In order to solve the second great problem of learning we need to
correct the three blunders of the traditional Enlightenment. This involves changing the nature
of social inquiry, so that social science becomes social methodology or social philosophy,
concerned to help us build into social life the progress-achieving methods of aim-oriented
rationality, arrived at by generalizing the progress-achieving methods of science. It also
involves, more generally, bringing about a revolution in the nature of academic inquiry as a
whole, so that it takes up its proper task of helping humanity learn how to become wiser by
increasingly cooperatively rational means. The scientific task of improving knowledge and
understanding of nature becomes a part of the broader task of improving global wisdom.
--------------
Humanity faces two great problems of learning: learning about the nature of the universe
and our place in it, and learning how to become civilized.
The first problem was cracked, in essence, in the 17th century, with the birth of modern
science. A method was discovered for progressively improving knowledge and understanding
of the natural world, the famous empirical method of science. There is of course much that we
still do not know and understand, three or four centuries after the birth of modern science;
nevertheless, during this time, science has immensely increased our knowledge and
understanding, at an ever accelerating rate. And with this unprecedented increase in scientific
knowledge and understanding has come a cascade of technological discoveries and
developments which have transformed the human condition [1]. It is this that has made the
modern world possible, so different in a multitude of ways from the world experienced by
people in Europe or north America only one or two centuries ago.
But it is much less certain that the second great problem of learning has been cracked.
Many, indeed, doubt that it can be solved at all. The 20th century record is not exactly
encouraging when one takes into account the millions slaughtered in countless wars, the2
millions killed in death camps, the all too many totalitarian regimes, the billions living today in
conditions of abject poverty in the third world, the annihilation of languages, cultures and
traditional ways of life during the century, the destruction of natural habitats and the rapid
extinction of species.
One might conclude that we are growing, not more civilized, but more barbaric. This is,
however, to draw the wrong conclusion from history. All our distinctively 20th century
disasters have one underlying cause: we have solved the first great problem of learning without
also having solved the second problem [2].
With rapidly increasing scientific knowledge comes rapidly increasing technological know-
how, which brings with it an immense increase in the power to act. In the absence of a solution
to the second great problem of learning, the increase in the power to act may have good
consequences, but will as often as not have all sorts of harmful consequences, whether intended
or not.
Just this is an all too apparent feature of our world. Science and technology have been used
in endless ways for human benefit, but have also been used to wreak havoc, whether
intentionally, in war, or unintentionally, in long-term environmental damage - a consequence
of growth of population, industry and agriculture, made possible by growth of technology. As
long as humanity's power to act was limited, lack of wisdom, of enlightenment did not matter
too much: humanity lacked the means to inflict too much damage on the planet [3]. But with
the immense increase in our powers to act that we have achieved in the last century or so, our
powers to destroy have become unprecedented and terrifying: global wisdom has become, not a
luxury, but a necessity. All our distinctively 20th century global problems, to repeat, have
arisen because we have solved the first great problem of learning without also solving the
second problem. Solving the first great problem of learning without solving the second is
bound to put humanity into a situation of great danger, and has in fact done just that.
It has become a matter of extreme urgency, for the future of humanity, that we discover how
to solve the second great problem of learning, not so that we achieve instant global wisdom,
but so that we learn how to make gradual social progress towards a wiser world.
The question arises: Can we learn from our solution to the first great problem of learning
how to solve the second problem? Can the progress-achieving methods of science be
generalized so that they become fruitfully applicable to the immense task of making social
progress towards a more civilized world?
The Enlightenment
The idea of learning from the solution to the first great problem of learning how to solve the
second problem is an old one. It goes back to the Enlightenment of the 18th century. Indeed,
this was the basic idea of the philosophes of the Enlightenment - Voltaire, Diderot, Condorcet
et al.: to learn from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards world
enlightenment.
The best of the philosophes did what they could to put this immensely important idea into
practice, in their lives. They fought dictatorial power, superstition, and injustice with weapons3
no more lethal than those of argument and wit. They gave their support to the virtues of
tolerance, openness to doubt, readiness to learn from criticism and from experience.
Courageously and energetically they laboured to promote rationality in personal and social life
[4].
Unfortunately, in developing the Enlightenment idea intellectually, the philosophes
blundered. They developed the Enlightenment programme in a seriously defective form, and it
is this immensely influential, defective version of the programme, inherited from the 18th
century, which may be called the "traditional" Enlightenment, that is built into late 20th century
institutions of inquiry. Our current traditions and institutions of learning, when judged from
the standpoint of helping us learn how to become more enlightened, are defective and irrational
in a wholesale and structural way, and it is this which, in the long term, sabotages our efforts to
create a more civilized world, and prevents us from avoiding the kind of horrors we have been
exposed to during the 20th century - wars, third-world poverty, environmental degradation.
The philosophes of the 18th century assumed, understandably enough, that the proper way
to implement the Enlightenment programme was to develop social science alongside natural
science. Francis Bacon had already stressed the importance of improving knowledge of the
natural world in order to achieve social progress [5]. The philosophes generalized this, holding
that it is just as important to improve knowledge of the social world. Thus the philosophes set
about creating the social sciences: history, anthropology, political economy, psychology,
sociology.
This had an immense impact. Throughout the 19th century the diverse social sciences were
developed, often by non-academics, in accordance with the Enlightenment idea [6]. Gradually,
universities took notice of these developments until, by the mid 20th century, all the diverse
branches of the social sciences, as conceived of by the Enlightenment, were built into the
institutional structure of universities as recognized academic disciplines.
But, from the standpoint of creating a kind of inquiry designed to help humanity learn how
to become civilized, all this amounts to a series of monumental blunders.
In order to implement properly the basic Enlightenment idea of learning from scientific
progress how to achieve social progress towards a civilized world, it is essential to get the
following three things right.
1. The progress-achieving methods of science need to be correctly identified.
2. These methods need to be correctly generalized so that they become fruitfully applicable to
any human endeavour, whatever the aims may be, and not just applicable to the endeavour of
improving knowledge.
3. The correctly generalized progress-achieving methods then need to be exploited correctly in
the great human endeavour of trying to make social progress towards an enlightened, civilized
world.
Unfortunately, the philosophes of the Enlightenment got all three points disastrously wrong.
They failed to capture correctly the progress-achieving methods of natural science; they failed
to generalize these methods properly; and, most disastrously of all, they failed to apply them4
properly so that humanity might learn how to become civilized by rational means. That the
philosophes made these blunders in the 18th century is forgivable; what is unforgivable is that
these blunders still remain unrecognized and uncorrected today, over two centuries later.
Instead of correcting the blunders, we have allowed our institutions of learning to be shaped by
them as they have developed throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, so that now the blunders
are an all-pervasive feature of our world.
The Enlightenment, and what it led to, has long been criticized, by the Romantic movement,
by what Isaiah Berlin has called 'the counter-Enlightenment' [7], and more recently by the
Frankfurt school, by postmodernists and others [8]. The objection to the traditional
Enlightenment of this essay is substantially different. In particular, it is the very opposite of all
those anti-rationalist, romantic and postmodernist criticisms which object to the way the
Enlightenment gives far too great an importance to natural science and to scientific rationality.
According to the argument of this essay, what is wrong with the traditional Enlightenment, and
the kind of academic inquiry we now possess derived from it, is not too much 'scientific
rationality' but, on the contrary, not enough. It is the glaring, wholesale irrationality of
contemporary academic inquiry, when judged from the standpoint of helping humanity learn
how to become more civilized, that is the problem.
The "New" Enlightenment
What exactly are the three blunders of the traditional Enlightenment, as embodied in
academic inquiry today, and what needs to be done to put them right? Let us take the three
blunders in turn.
The first blunder concerns the nature of the progress-achieving methods of science.
Scientists and philosophers of science today make the assumption, inherited from the
Enlightenment [9], that science makes progress because, in science, theories are assessed
impartially on the basis of evidence alone, no permanent assumption being made about the
nature of the universe independent of evidence. Choice of theory in science may be influenced
by such considerations as the relative simplicity, unity or explanatory power of the theories in
question, in addition to empirical considerations; this is permissible, as long as it does not
involve assuming, permanently, that nature herself is simple, unified or comprehensible [10].
But this orthodox standard empiricist assumption about the nature of the progress-achieving
methods of science is untenable [11]. Given any scientific theory, however well verified
empirically, there will always be infinitely many rival theories, equally well supported by the
evidence, which make different predictions, in an arbitrary way, for phenomena not yet
observed. One can set out to refute these rival theories by making the relevant observations or
experiments, but as there are infinitely many of them this may take some time. In short, if
science really did take seriously the idea that theories must be selected on the basis of evidence
alone, science would be swamped by an infinity of empirically equally successful rival
theories; science would come to an end.
This does not happen in scientific practice because, in practice, given an accepted, well
verified theory, such as Newtonian theory, quantum theory, or general relativity, almost all the
infinitely many equally empirically successful rival theories are, in comparison, grotesquely ad
hoc and disunified. They postulate, arbitrarily, that - for example - at some time in the future5
Newton's inverse square law of gravitation becomes an inverse cube law. Such theories are, in
practice, excluded from scientific consideration on the grounds that they lack simplicity, unity
or explanatory power.
Now comes the crucial point. In persistently excluding infinitely many such empirically
successful but grotesquely ad hoc theories, science in effect makes a big assumption about the
nature of the universe, to the effect that it is such that no grotesquely ad hoc theory is true,
however empirically successful it may appear to be for a time. Without some such big
assumption as this, the empirical method of science collapses. Science is drowned in an
infinite ocean of empirically successful ad hoc theories [12].
At once the question arises: Granted that science must make some kind of big assumption
about the nature of the universe if it is to be possible at all, what precisely ought this
assumption to be, and on what basis is it to be made? We must make some assumption about
the ultimate nature of the universe before science can proceed at all; if science is to proceed
successfully we must make an assumption that is near enough correct: and yet it is just here
that we are horribly ignorant, and are almost bound to get things hopelessly wrong.
The solution to this basic dilemma confronting the scientific endeavour (as expounded in
some detail in my The Comprehensibility of the Universe) can be put like this. Cosmological
speculation about the ultimate nature of the universe, being necessary for science to be possible
at all, must be regarded as a part of scientific knowledge itself, however epistemologically
unsound it may be in other respects. The best such speculation available is that the universe is
comprehensible in some way or other and, more specifically, in the light of the immense
apparent success of modern natural science, that it is physically comprehensible. But both
these speculations may be false; in order to take this possibility into account, we need to adopt
a hierarchy of increasingly contentless cosmological conjectures concerning the
comprehensibility and knowability of the universe until we arrive at the conjecture that the
universe is such that it is possible for us to acquire some knowledge of something, a conjecture
so contentless that it could not be rational for us to reject it in any circumstances whatsoever.
As a result of adopting such a hierarchy of increasingly contentless cosmological conjectures in
this way, we maximize our chances of adopting conjectures that promote the growth of
knowledge, and minimize our chances of taking some cosmological assumption for granted
that is false and impedes the growth of knowledge: see diagram 1. The hope is that as we
increase our knowledge about the world we improve (lower level) cosmological assumptions
implicit in our methods, and thus in turn improve our methods. As a result of improving our
knowledge we improve our knowledge about how to improve knowledge. Science adapts its
own nature to what it learns about the nature of the universe, thus increasing its capacity to
make progress in knowledge about the world.
This aim-oriented empiricist methodology, in stark contrast to current orthodoxy, is the key
to the success of modern science. The basic aim of science of discovering how, and to what
extent, the universe is comprehensible is deeply problematic; it is essential that we try to
improve the aim, and associated methods, as we proceed, in the light of apparent success and
failure. In order to do this in the best possible way we need to represent our aim at a number of
levels, from the specific and problematic to the highly unspecific and unproblematic, thus
creating a framework of fixed aims and meta-methods within which the (more or less specific)6
aims and methods of science may be progressively improved in the light of apparent empirical
success and failure, as depicted in diagram 1. The result is that, as we improve our knowledge
about the world we are able to improve our knowledge about how to improve knowledge, the
methodological key to the rapid progress of modern science [13].
Adoption of this aim-oriented empiricist view by the scientific community as the official,
orthodox conception of science would correct the first blunder of the traditional Enlightenment.
Diagram 1: Aim-Oriented Empiricism
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But what of the second blunder? The task, here, is to generalize the progress-achieving
methods of science appropriately so that they become progress-achieving methods that are,
potentially, fruitfully applicable to any problematic human endeavour. The task, in other
words, is so to generalize scientific rationality that it becomes rationality per se, helping us to
achieve what is of value whatever we may be doing.
Needless to say, scientists and philosophers, having failed to specify the methods of science
properly, have also failed to arrive at the proper generalization of these methods. The best
attempt known to me is that made by Karl Popper. According to Popper, science makes
progress because it puts into practice the method of proposing theories as conjectures, which
are then subjected to sustained attempted empirical refutation [14]. Popper argues that this can
be generalized to form a conception of rationality, according to which one seeks to solve
problems quite generally by putting forward conjectures as to how a given problem is to be
solved, these conjectures then being subjected to sustained criticism (criticism being a
generalization of attempted empirical refutation in science) [15].
Popper's ideas about scientific method and how it is to be generalized are an improvement
over 18th century notions, but they are still defective. Popper's conception of scientific method
is defective because it is a version of standard empiricism, which we have already seen is
untenable. It fails to identify the problematic aim of science properly, and thus fails to specify
the need for science to improve its aims and methods as it proceeds. Popper's notion of critical
rationalism is defective in an analogous way. It does not make improving aims and methods,
when aims are problematic, an essential aspect of rationality [16].
If, however, we take the above aim-oriented empiricist conception of scientific method as
our starting point, and generalize that, the outcome is quite different. It is not just in science
that aims are problematic; this is the case in life too, either because different aims conflict, or
because what we believe to be desirable and realizable lacks one or other of these features, or
both. Above all, the aim of creating global civilization is inherently and profoundly
problematic [17]. Quite generally, then, and not just in science, whenever we pursue a
problematic aim we need to represent the aim as a hierarchy of aims, from the specific and
problematic at the bottom of the hierarchy, to the general and unproblematic at the top. In this
way we provide ourselves with a framework within which we may improve more or less
specific and problematic aims and methods as we proceed, learning from success and failure in
practice what it is that is both of most value and realizable. Such an "aim-oriented" conception
of rationality is the proper generalization of the aim-oriented, progress-achieving methods of
science [18].
So much for the second blunder, and how it is to be put right. We come now to the third
blunder.
This is by far the most serious of the three blunders made by the traditional Enlightenment.
The basic Enlightenment idea, after all, is to learn from our solution to the first great problem
of learning how to solve the second problem - to learn, that is, from scientific progress how to
make social progress towards an enlightened world. Putting this idea into practice involves
getting appropriately generalized progress-achieving methods of science into social life itself!8
It involves getting progress-achieving methods into our institutions and ways of life, into
government, industry, agriculture, commerce, international relations, the media, the arts,
education. But in sharp contrast to all this, the traditional Enlightenment has sought to apply
generalized scientific method, not to social life, but merely to social science! Instead of
helping humanity learn how to become more civilized by rational means, the traditional
Enlightenment has sought merely to help social scientists improve knowledge of social
phenomena. The outcome is that today academic inquiry devotes itself to acquiring knowledge
of natural and social phenomena, but does not attempt to help humanity learn how to become
more civilized. This is the blunder that is at the root of our current failure to have solved the
second great problem of learning [19].
In order to correct this third, monumental and disastrous blunder, we need, as a first step, to
bring about a revolution in the nature of academic inquiry, beginning with social inquiry and
the humanities (as set out in some detail in my From Knowledge to Wisdom) [20]. Social
inquiry is not primarily social science. Its proper basic task is to help humanity build into
institutions and social life quite generally the progress-achieving methods of aim-oriented
rationality (arrived at by generalizing the progress-achieving methods of science as indicated
above). Social inquiry (sociology, economics, anthropology and the rest) is thus social
methodology or social philosophy. Its task is to help diverse valuable human endeavours and
institutions gradually improve aims and methods so that the world may make social progress
towards global enlightenment. And the primary task of academic inquiry, more generally,
becomes to help humanity solve its problems of living in increasingly rational, cooperative,
enlightened ways, thus helping humanity become more civilized. The basic aim of academic
inquiry becomes to promote the growth of wisdom - wisdom being defined as the capacity to
realize what is of value in life (and thus including knowledge and technological know-how).
Those parts of academic inquiry devoted to improving knowledge, understanding and
technological know-how contribute to the growth of wisdom.
As I have already remarked, the aim of achieving global civilization is inherently
problematic. This means, according to aim-oriented rationality, that we need to represent the
aim at a number of levels, from the specific and highly problematic to the unspecific and
unproblematic. Thus, at a fairly specific level, we might, for example, specify civilization to
be a state of affairs in which there is an end to war, dictatorships, population growth, extreme
inequalities of wealth, and the establishment of democratic, liberal world government and a
sustainable world industry and agriculture. At a rather more general level we might specify
civilization to be a state of affairs in which everyone shares equally in enjoying, sustaining and
creating what is of value in life in so far as this is possible. At a still more general level,
civilization might be specified simply as that realizable world order we should seek to attain in
the long term: see diagram 2.
As a result of building into our institutions and social life such a hierarchical structure of
aims and associated methods, we create a framework within which it becomes possible for us
progressively to improve our real-life aims and methods in increasingly cooperative ways as we
live. Diverse philosophies of life - diverse religious, political, economic and moral views -
may be cooperatively developed, assessed and tested against the experience of personal and
social life. It becomes possible progressively to improve diverse philosophies of life (diverse
views about what is of value in life and how it is to be realized) much as theories are9
progressively and cooperatively improved in science. In doing this, humanity would at last
have learned from the solution to the first great problem of learning how to go about solving
the second problem.
Objections
I now consider, briefly, some objections that may be raised against the thesis and argument
of this paper.
It may be objected that the traditional Enlightenment does not dominate current academic
inquiry to the extent that I have assumed. But grounds for holding that it does are given in
chapter six of my From Knowledge to Wisdom. There I looked at the following: (1) books
about the modern university; (2) the philosophy and sociology of science; (3) statements of
leading scientists; (4) Physics Abstracts; (5) Chemistry, Biology, Geo and Psychology
Abstracts; (6) journal titles and contents; (7) books on economics, sociology and psychology;
(8) philosophy. In 1984, the year From Knowledge to Wisdom was published, there can be no
doubt whatsoever that the traditional Enlightenment (or "the philosophy of knowledge" as I
called it in the book) dominated academic inquiry.
Diagram 2: Aim-Oriented Rationality applied to the task
of making progress towards a civilized world10
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Have things changed since then? The revolution advocated by From Knowledge to
Wisdom, and argued for here, has not occurred. There is still, amongst the vast majority of
academics today, no awareness at all that a more intellectually rigorous and humanly valuable
kind of inquiry than that which we have at present, exists as an option. In particular, social
inquiry continues to be taught and pursued as social science, and not as social methodology.
Recently I undertook an examination, at random, of thirty-four introductory books on
sociology, published between 1985 and 1997. Sociology, typically, is defined as "the scientific
study of human society and social interactions" [21], as "the systematic, sceptical study of
human society" [22], or as having as its basic aim "to understand human societies and the
forces that have made them what they are" [23]. Some books take issue with the idea that
sociology is the scientific study of society, or protest at the male dominated nature of sociology
[24]. Nowhere did I find a hint of the idea that a primary task of sociology, or of social inquiry
more generally, might be to help build into the fabric of social life progress-achieving methods,
generalized from those of science, designed to help humanity resolve its conflicts and problems
of living in more cooperatively rational ways than at present.
The tackling of problems of living rather than problems of knowledge does of course go on
within the academic enterprise as it is at present constituted, within such disciplines as
economics, development studies, policy studies, peace studies, medicine, agriculture,
engineering, and elsewhere. But this does not tell against the point that the primary task of
academic inquiry at present is, first, to acquire knowledge and technological know-how, and
then, second, to apply it to help solve problems of living. It does not, in other words, tell
against the point that it is the traditional Enlightenment that is the dominant influence on the
nature, the aims and methods, the whole character and structure of academic inquiry.
It may be objected that it is all to the good that the academic enterprise today does give
priority to the pursuit of knowledge over the task of promoting wisdom and civilization.
Before problems of living can be tackled rationally, knowledge must first be acquired [25].
I have six replies to this objection.
First, even if the objection were valid, it would still be vital for a kind of inquiry designed
to help us build a better world to include rational exploration of problems of living, and to
ensure that this guides priorities of scientific research (and is guided by the results of such
research).
Second, the validity of the objection becomes dubious when we take into account the
considerable success people met with in solving problems of living in a state of extreme
ignorance, before the advent of science. We still today often arrive at solutions to problems of
living in ignorance of relevant facts.
Third, the objection is not valid. In order to articulate problems of living and explore
imaginatively and critically possible solutions (in accordance with Popper's conception of
rationality) we need to be able to act in the world, imagine possible actions and share our11
imaginings with others: in so far as some common sense knowledge is implicit in all this, such
knowledge is required to tackle rationally and successfully problems of living. But this does
not mean that we must give intellectual priority to acquiring new relevant knowledge before we
can be in a position to tackle rationally our problems of living.
Fourth, simply in order to have some idea of what kind of knowledge or know-how it is
relevant for us to try to acquire, we must first have some provisional ideas as to what our
problem of living is and what we might do to solve it. Articulating our problem of living and
proposing and critically assessing possible solutions needs to be intellectually prior to
acquiring relevant knowledge simply for this reason: we cannot know what new knowledge it
is relevant for us to acquire until we have at least a preliminary idea as to what our problem of
living is, and what we propose to do about it. A slight change in the way we construe our
problem may lead to a drastic change in the kind of knowledge it is relevant to
acquire: changing the way we construe problems of health, to include prevention of disease
(and not just curing of disease) leads to a dramatic change in the kind of knowledge we need to
acquire (importance of exercise, diet etc.). Including the importance of avoiding pollution in
the problem of creating wealth by means of industrial development leads to the need to develop
entirely new kinds of knowledge.
Fifth, relevant knowledge is often hard to acquire; it would be a disaster if we suspended
life until it had been acquired. Knowledge of how our brains work is presumably highly
relevant to all that we do but clearly, suspending rational tackling of problems of living until
this relevant knowledge has been acquired would not be a sensible step to take. It would, in
any case, make it impossible for us to acquire the relevant knowledge (since this requires
scientists to act in doing research). Scientific research is itself a kind of action carried on in a
state of relative ignorance.
Sixth, the capacity to act, to live, more or less successfully in the world, is more
fundamental than (propositional) knowledge. Put in Rylean terms, 'knowing how' is more
fundamental than 'knowing that' [26]. All our knowledge is but a development of our capacity
to act. Dissociated from life, from action, knowledge stored in libraries is just paper and ink,
devoid of meaning. In this sense, problems of living are more fundamental than problems of
knowledge (which are but an aspect of problems of living); giving intellectual priority to
problems of living quite properly reflects this point [27].
It deserves to be noted that a kind of inquiry that gives priority to tackling problems of
knowledge over problems of living violates the most elementary requirements of rationality
conceivable. If the basic task is to help humanity create a better world, then the problems that
need to be solved are, primarily, problems of living, problems of action, not problems of
knowledge. This means that to comply, merely, with Popper's conception of critical
rationalism (or problem-solving rationality) discussed above, the basic intellectual tasks need
to be (1) to articulate problems of living, and (2) to propose and critically assess possible
solutions, possible more or less cooperative human actions. (1) and (2) are excluded, or
marginalized, by a kind of inquiry that gives priority to the task of solving problems of
knowledge. And the result will be a kind of inquiry that fails to create a reservoir of
imaginative and critically examined ideas for the resolution of problems of living, and instead
develops knowledge often unrelated to, or even harmful to, our most basic human needs.12
It may be objected that in employing aim-oriented rationality in an attempt to help create a
more civilized world, in the way indicated above, the new Enlightenment falls foul of Popper's
strictures against Utopian social engineering [28]. I have three replies to this objection. First,
to the extent that piecemeal social engineering, of the kind advocated by Popper, is indeed the
rational way to make progress towards a more civilized world, this will be advocated by the
New Enlightenment. Second, when we take into account the unprecedented global nature of
many of our most serious problems, indicated at the beginning of this essay (the outcome of
solving the first great problem of learning but failing to solve the second), we may well doubt
that piecemeal social engineering is sufficient. Third, Popper's distinction between piecemeal
and Utopian social engineering is altogether too crude: it overlooks entirely what has been
advocated here, aim-oriented rationalistic social engineering, with its emphasis on developing
increasingly cooperatively rational resolutions of human conflicts and problems in full
recognition of the inherently problematic nature of the aim of achieving greater civilization
[29].
All those to any degree influenced by Romanticism and the counter-Enlightenment will
object strongly to the idea that we should learn from scientific progress how to achieve social
progress towards civilization; they will object strongly to the idea of allowing conceptions of
rationality, stemming from science, to dominate in this way, and will object even more strongly
to the idea, inherent in the new Enlightenment, that we need to create a more aim-oriented
rationalistic social world [30].
Directed at the traditional Enlightenment, objections of this kind have some validity; but
directed at the new Enlightenment, they have none. As I have emphasized elsewhere, aim-
oriented rationality amounts to a synthesis of traditional rationalist and romantic ideals, and not
to the triumph of the first over the second. In giving priority to the realization of what is of
value in life, and in emphasizing that rationality demands that we seek to improve aims as we
proceed, the new Enlightenment requires that rationality integrates traditional Rationalist and
Romantic values and ideals of integrity. Imagination, emotion, desire, art, empathic
understanding of people and culture, the imaginative exploration of aims and ideals, which
tend to be repudiated as irrational by traditional Rationalism, but which are prized by
Romanticism, are all essential ingredients of aim-oriented rationality. Far from crushing
freedom, spontaneity, creativity and diversity, aim-oriented rationality is essential for the
desirable flourishing of these things in life [31].
Many historians and sociologists of science deny that there is any such thing as scientific
method or scientific progress, and will thus find the basic idea of this essay absurd [32]. These
writers are encouraged in their views by the long-standing failure of scientists and philosophers
of science to explain clearly what scientific method is, and how it is to be justified. This
excuse for not taking scientific method and progress seriously is, however, no longer viable: as
I have indicated above, reject standard empiricism in all its forms, and it becomes clear how
scientific method and progress are to be characterized and justified, in a way which emphasizes
the rational interplay between evolving knowledge and evolving aims and methods of science
[33]. In a world dominated by the products of scientific progress it is quixotic in the extreme
to deny that such progress has taken place.13
Finally, those of a more rationalist persuasion may object that science is too different from
political life for there to be anything worthwhile to be learnt from scientific success about how
to achieve social progress towards civilization [34]. (a) In science there is a decisive procedure
for eliminating ideas, namely, empirical refutation: nothing comparable obtains, or can obtain,
in the political domain. (b) In science experiments or trials may be carried out relatively
painlessly (except, perhaps, when new drugs are being given in live trials); in life, social
experiments, in that they involve people, may cause much pain if they go wrong, and may be
difficult to stop once started. (c) Scientific progress requires a number of highly intelligent and
motivated people to pursue science on the behalf of the rest of us, funded by government and
industry; social progress requires almost everyone to take part, including the stupid, the
criminal, the mad or otherwise handicapped, the ill, the highly unmotivated; and in general
there is no payment. (d) Scientists, at a certain level, have an agreed, common objective: to
improve knowledge. In life, people often have quite different or conflicting goals, and there is
no general agreement as to what civilization ought to mean, or even whether it is desirable to
pursue civilization in any sense. (e) Science is about fact, politics about value, the quality of
life. This difference ensures that science has nothing to teach political action (for civilization).
(f) Science is male-dominated, fiercely competitive, and at times terrifyingly impersonal [35];
this means it is quite unfit to provide any kind of guide for life.
Here, briefly, are my replies. (a) Some proposals for action can be shown to be
unacceptable quite decisively as a result of experience acquired through attempting to put the
proposal into action. Where this is not possible, it may still be possible to assess the merits of
the proposal to some extent by means of experience. If assessing proposals for action by
means of experience is much more indecisive than assessing scientific theories by means of
experiment, then we need, all the more, to devote our care and attention to the former case. (b)
Precisely because experimentation in life is so much more difficult than in science, it is vital
that in life we endeavour to learn as much as possible from (i) experiments that we perform in
our imagination, and (ii) experiments that occur as a result of what actually happens. (c)
Because humanity does not have the aptitude or desire for wisdom that scientists have for
knowledge, it is unreasonable to suppose that progress towards global wisdom could be as
explosively rapid as progress in science. Nevertheless progress in wisdom might go better than
it does at present. (d) Cooperative rationality is only feasible when there is the common desire
of those involved to resolve conflicts in a cooperatively rational way. (e) Aim-oriented
rationality can help us improve our decisions about what is desirable or of value, even if it
cannot reach decisions for us. (f) In taking science as a guide for life, it is the progress-
achieving methodology of science to which we need to attend. It is this that we need to
generalize in such a way that it becomes fruitfully applicable, potentially, to all that we do.
That modern science is male-dominated, fiercely competitive, and at times terrifyingly
impersonal should not deter us from seeing what can be learned from the progress-achieving
methods of science - unless, perhaps, it should turn out that being male-dominated, fiercely
competitive and impersonal is essential to scientific method and progress. (But this, I submit,
is not the case.)
Conclusion
Having solved the first great problem of learning, it has become a matter of extreme
urgency, as far as the future of humanity is concerned, that we discover how to solve the14
second problem. In order to do this we need to correct the three blunders of the traditional
Enlightenment. This involves changing the nature of social inquiry, so that social science
becomes social methodology or social philosophy, concerned to help us build into social life
the progress-achieving methods of aim-oriented rationality, arrived at by generalizing the
progress-achieving methods of science. It also involves, more generally, bringing about a
revolution in the nature of academic inquiry as a whole, so that it takes up its proper task of
helping humanity learn how to become wiser by increasingly cooperatively rational means.
The scientific task of improving knowledge and understanding of nature becomes a part of the
broader task of improving global wisdom.
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